The Varying Political Toll of Concerns About Corruption in Good Versus Bad Economic Times. Comparative Political Studies.
In this article we argue, and test empirically with data from LAPOP's AmericasBarometer, that citizens penalize presidents more heavily for perceived corruption when the national economy is performing poorly, while favorable economic conditions soften this effect.
Flying Under the Radar: How Frames Influence Public Officials’ Perceptions of Corruption. Political Behavior.
Rational models of corruption assume that civil servants recognize bribery as corruption and weigh its risks and opportunities. We show that bribes are less likely to be recognized as corruption when framed as promoting redistribution, institutional flexibility, or organizational effectiveness.
Constructions of Noncompliance: Narratives and Contexts in the Case of Administrative Corruption. International Public Management Journal.
This study examines how public managers draw the boundary between legitimate discretion and administrative noncompliance. It shows how narratives about deserving citizens and rigid procedures can legitimize rule-breaking by casting bureaucrats as problem-solving actors.
This book chapter argues that natural and strategic resources create incentives for political and criminal actors to capture local governments. It shows how geography shapes corrupt networks, weakens oversight, and contributes to the consolidation of municipal corruption.
When Informality Excludes: Corruption as a Barrier to Women’s Political Empowerment. Palgrave Macmillan.
This forthcoming book chapter argues that corruption functions as an informal gatekeeping mechanism shaping women’s formal political participation. Using AmericasBarometer data, it shows how lower exposure to corruption limits women’s engagement in political organizations.